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Civil Rights in the Locker Room:
Ludtke v. Kuhn
By MARY LYNN BRENNAN*
I
Introduction
Sports reporting, long the province of male writers, is a
major field of journalism that is now beginning to open up to
women.2 But getting the job as a sportswriter is only half the
battle. When sports teams deny women writers equal access
to their locker rooms for post-game interviews, they deny wo-
men an equal chance to compete with their male counterparts.
In response to being barred from the New York Yankees
locker room during the 1977 World Series, Melissa Ludtke, a
sportswriter for Sports Illustrated, and its publisher, Time,
Inc., brought a suit against the New York Yankees, Major
League Baseball, and the City of New York.3 The 1978 suit,
filed in the Southern District Court of New York, claimed that
the New York Yankees were violating Ms. Ludkte's civil rights
by enforcing a policy which excluded female reporters from
the locker room of the Yankee clubhouse in Yankee Stadium.'
* Member, Third Year Class.
The author wishes to thank Professor Trina Grillo of Hastings College of the Law for
her valuable assistance in the preparation of this note.
1. 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
2. Affidavits of Professional Journalists for Plaintiffs, at tab 13, Elie Abel, Dean of
the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F.
Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In 1978, more than 50% of the students at the Columbia
School of Journalism were women. Id.
3. The actual parties named as defendants in the suit were Bowie Kuhn, the
Commissioner of Baseball, Leland MacPhail, President of the American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, the New York Yankees Partnership, the Mayor of the
City of New York, the Commissioner of Parks and Recreation for the City of New York,
and the Director of the Economic Development Administration of the City of New
York.
4. The policy determination was made by Baseball Commissioner Kuhn and ap-
proved by American League President MacPhail. This determination was made
known to Ms. Ludtke's employer, Time, Inc., by a letter from the Commissioner's office
to the general managers of all major league baseball teams. 461 F. Supp. at 89. Larry
Shenk, the public relations director of the Philadelphia Phillies, was assigned by the
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The plaintiffs sought an injunction ordering the Yankees to
stop excluding Ms. Ludtke from the clubhouse. The plaintiffs
also sought, initially, damages and attorneys' fees. 5 However,
no monetary damages were ever claimed or proved, so the re-
quest for damages was dropped.6
After the defendants answered the complaint, the plaintiffs
filed a motion for summary judgment. In response, the base-
ball defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. At
the hearing on the summary judgment motions, the City de-
fendants were dropped from the action as unnecessary par-
ties.' The court directed the parties to try to reach a
settlement that would result in equal access to ballplayers by
both male and female sports reporters. The defendants had ac-
cused the plaintiffs of bad faith in bringing the suit and of fail-
ing to respond to reasonable settlement suggestions.
When the parties were unable to reach a settlement, the
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the summary judgment
motion. The court held that the Kuhn policy determination
constituted state action within the contemplation of the Four-
teenth Amendment and that the state action violated plaintiff
Ludtke's rights secured to her by both the equal protection
clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The court granted the plaintiffs' request for an injunc-
tion, and ordered the New York Yankees to stop excluding
Commissioner's office to try to bring players out of the clubhouse to speak with her in
the tunnel where she was made to stand. Id. at 90.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) provides that, "In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of . . . [section . . . 1983] . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the pre-
vailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) provides for a civil action where an individual alleges a deprivation of his civil
rights. See note 21, infra.
6. 461 F. Supp. at 88.
7. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (1). It appeared that complete relief could be accorded
the plaintiffs by an order directed solely to the baseball defendants. 461 F. Supp. at 88.
This was ironic since it was necessary for the court to find that the City of New York
had been a participant in the discrimination against plaintiff Ludtke in order to decide
the case on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. See state action discussion in notes 27-
31 and accompanying text, infra.
8. The defendants may have offered the plaintiffs some alternative methods of
gaining access to the athletes, although no such offers were mentioned in the case.
However, these methods did not provide "equal access by women reporters to ball-
players in the Stadium at the same time that such access is accorded male reporters,"
as the plaintiffs' counsel had requested. 461 F. Supp. at 89. See note 16 and accompa-
nying text, infra, for alternatives used before this suit was heard. See also note 73 and
accompanying text, infra, for alternatives implemented after settlement.
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women from their locker room.' Plaintiffs were also awarded
attorneys' fees. Although the defendants filed an appeal, it was
subsequently dropped."o
Melissa Ludtke became a reporter on Sports Illustrated in
1974, shortly after her graduation from Wellesley College."
She has covered both baseball and basketball for the maga-
zine. In 1978, when the action against the Yankees was de-
cided, she was 26 years old.
Although her byline appeared in the magazine occasionally,
she usually did research for writers who were senior to her.
Her employer, Time, Inc., had a working staff more than fifty
percent female. However, a few years ago some of the women
employees filed a discrimination complaint against Time, Inc.,
with the New York Division of Human Rights. An agreement
was reached before any action was taken on the complaint."
Because of the discrimination complaint against her em-
ployer and the proximity of its settlement to Ms. Ludtke's own
difficulties with discrimination, she said in an interview after
the case was settled that she believed her suit against the
Yankees "was the most convenient way for Time, Inc., to show
its support for women." 13
The crux of the problem for women sportswriters who are
excluded from team locker rooms is that the interviews they
obtain from players at places other than in team clubhouses
lack the spontaneity of immediate post-game interviews. This
is especially important to magazine writers who do not have
the advantage that familiarity with the players gives the news-
9. 461 F. Supp. at 99.
10. Although there was no explanation by the defendants for their decision not to
appeal, it may have been prompted by the result of Kuhn's attempt to get a stay of
action from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals while the appeal was being com-
pleted. The stay motion was quickly denied by a three judge panel. Presiding Judge
Walter Mansfield commented on the argument by Kuhn that baseball is a family game:
"The last I heard, the family includes women as well as men." Angell, The Sporting
Scene: Sharing the Beat, THE NEW YORKER, April 9,1979, at 47.
Also, pursuant to FED. R. AP. P. 42(b), the defendants dismissed the appeal without
prejudice to their rights to appeal from any order of the district court awarding attor-
neys fees to plaintiffs. 1 Sports Law Rep., Feb. 1979, at 6.
11. Angell, supra note 10, at 70. Melissa Ludtke has shoulder-length brown hair
and an oval-shaped face and is what most observers would call attractive. She is no
longer single, as she was when she was denied access to the Yankee clubhouse. In
1978, she was married to Eric Lincoln, who is an editor and reporter with the sports
department of the N.Y. Times. Id. at 50.
12. Id. at 72.
13. Id.
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paper writers who cover the team on a daily basis." Often,
sportswriters for magazines must rely instead on a single visit
to size up a team.
Sportswriters feel that the best interviews are obtained
when players are contacted fresh-off-the-field. The exhilara-
tion of victory and the crush of defeat are emotional reactions
that are keenest just after the game is finished. Players often
reveal the things that make for the most interesting stories in
the relaxed atmosphere of the clubhouse.15
Prior to Ludtke, some football and baseball teams attempted
to accommodate women sportwriters excluded from the teams'
locker rooms by alternate methods such as bringing the play-
ers outside after they had dressed.'" But the results were less
than satisfactory to women. One writer, Stephanie Salter of
the San Francisco Examiner, when questioned about the util-
ity of this procedure, answered that the players have "already
been asked most of the same questions and they are not al-
ways so cooperative.""
The disparate treatment accorded male and female sports-
writers prompted Ms. Ludtke and Time, Inc., to file the suit
against the Yankees. At the time the action was initiated, Me-
lissa Ludtke was one of 22 reporters for Sports Illustrated, 15 of
whom were women.'" Since one or two reporters were as-
signed to cover each sport, there simply were "not enough men
to go around." 9 The editors of the magazine found it neces-
sary to assign work to their sportswriters without regard to
their sex. 20
The Ludtke action was brought under section 1983 which al-
lows a private remedial action for discrimination in employ-
ment.2 1 The plaintiffs invoked the district court's original
14. Affidavits of Professional Journalists for Plaintiffs, supra note 2, at tab 5, Pete
Axthelm of NEWSWEEK.
15. Id. at tab 11, Robin Herman of the N.Y. Times.
16. Other alternatives used by teams who refused to grant locker room access to
female reporters included arranging for a separate interview room for women writers,
appointing a team representative to bring players to whom the writers want to talk
outside after the athletes are dressed, or simply having the women writers wait in a
corridor or equipment room for the players to emerge. Angell, supra note 10, at 47.
17. Shah & Whitmore, Locker-Room Lib, NEWSWEEK, January 16, 1978, at 86.
18. Affidavits of Professional Journalists for Plaintiffs, supra note 2, at tab 3,
Mervin Hyman of SPORTS ILLUSTRATED.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides that "Every person who, under color of any
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jurisdiction over civil actions authorized by law "To redress
the deprivation, under color of any State law . .. of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States. . . ."22
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn insisted that his policy of ex-
cluding female sportswriters from the Yankee clubhouse was
necessary (1) to protect the privacy of those players who were
undressed or who were in various stages of undressing and
getting ready to shower; (2) to protect the image of baseball as
a family sport; and (3) to preserve traditional notions of de-
cency and propriety.23
After the suit was filed, no compromise between Kuhn's po-
sition and Ludtke's request for equal access could be worked
out. Ludtke was excluded from the Yankee clubhouse solely
because of her sex, as were all accredited female sports report-
ers. All accredited male sports reporters were granted access
to the clubhouse after games for the purpose of interviewing
ballplayers. The material facts regarding the discrimination
against the plaintiff, the involvement of New York City in Yan-
kee Stadium, and the lease of the Stadium to the Yankees were
not disputed.24
Pursuant to Federal Rule 56(c) which directs a court to enter
judgment for a party when there are no material facts in dis-
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was passed under the specific grant of congressional power
in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: "The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). This section is the jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983.
See note 21 and accompanying text, supra.
By pure chance, the only woman judge of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Judge Constance Baker Motley, was assigned the case.
Elliott, Gal Scribes Steam Up Locker-Room Crusade, SPORTING NEWS, Feb. 18, 1978, at
33. There was no indication that this was an issue for the defendants in the case. Coin-
cidentally, Judge Motley was one of a small group of lawyers who, before their appoint-
ments to the federal bench, appeared in a series of cases brought in courts throughout
the South. Constance Motley, Thurgood Marshall, and Spotswood Robinson devel-
oped the legal principles which gave rise to the civil rights movement. R. KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY, 273, 638, 760, 775 (1976).
23. 461 F. Supp. at 92.
24. Id. at 88, 89-92.
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pute,2 5 it became necessary for the district court to decide
whether the Kuhn policy determination violated the plaintiffs'
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.2 6
II
The State Action Issue
Central to the resolution of this case was the district court's
finding that the Kuhn policy determination, implemented by
the New York Yankees, constituted state action within the con-
templation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth
Amendment applies only to the actions of a state or govern-
mental entity. Because the language of the amendment refers
only to acts of discrimination by a public entity, i.e., state ac-
tion,the amendment cannot be used to regulate what is essen-
tially discrimination by a private entity.
Section 1983, the statute passed by Congress to provide for a
private employment discrimination suit, also requires state ac-
tion.28 Thus, an issue often arising in civil rights cases is
whether a seemingly private party's actions come within the
terms of the statute and thus violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Although several tests for finding state action have emerged
from court decisions, there are no generally accepted formulae
for determining when there is a sufficient amount of govern-
mental action to justify subjecting the practice to constitu-
tional restraints.
The broad language of section 1983 gives the federal courts
the power to decide whether a private entity has been acting
under color of state law. 0 Once state action is found to be
25. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c) provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith ... if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
27. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See notes 21-22, supra.
29. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 473
(1978).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note 21, supra.
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present in a case and the civil rights deprivation is established,
the party alleging the wrongdoing can obtain a remedy from
the court. 31
In deciding what is meant by "under color of state law,"
courts have preferred to determine this issue on a case-by-case
basis. The standard used by the Supreme Court to examine
the degree of state involvement in private conduct was first an-
nounced in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.32 The
Court said that such involvement is to be determined by "sift-
ing facts and weighing circumstances."3 3 The lower courts
have been struggling with this standard ever since. However,
commentators suggest that what the courts actually do is to
look to the underlying merits of the case. In those instances
where the conduct of the defendant can be deemed to be espe-
cially offensive, the courts interpret state action broadly and
scrutinize carefully the relationship between the actor and the
state. This flexibility in interpreting the state action require-
ment would be precluded by the use of a stricter, more clearly
enunciated standard.
The proposition that courts examine the underlying merits
of the case before deciding the state action issue is borne out
by an examination of the results in these discrimination cases.
With one exception, whenever a court has found that state ac-
tion is present, it has gone on to find that action unconstitu-
tional under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 5
Three theories exist under which a court can find state ac-
tion: (1) the public function concept; (2) state commandment
or encouragement of private activities; and (3) mutual contacts
between the government and the alleged wrongdoer.3 6
Where private persons are engaged in the exercise of govern-
mental functions, the courts are especially likely to find the
existence of state action. Examples of governmental functions
are the services rendered to the public by the management of a
park," and the management of a company-owned town by a
private corporation. In these cases the finding of state action
31. Id.
32. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
33. Id. at 722.
34. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 29, at 473-75.
35. PUC v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
36. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, supra note 29, at 456-73.
37. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
38. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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is particularly appropriate because the private entities operate
as an instrumentality or agency of the government. Perform-
ance of an essentially governmental function subjects a private
entity to the same treatment it would receive if it were a mu-
nicipal agency performing its public function.
Under the state commandment theory, a state can be
deemed to be responsible for the activities of a private entity
when the state has failed to act to prevent the discriminatory
activity. This theory has been applied in a situation where a
private club leased land from a state and practiced discrimina-
tory membership policies,39 and where a city dedicated a street
to public use but private landowners prevented public access
to the street.4 0 In these cases, because the property involved
was owned by the state, the courts found that the state had a
duty to insure that the use of the land by private entities con-
formed with all applicable state and federal laws. When this
duty was not met, inaction by the state constituted state action.
The third theory which courts use to find state action is less
clearly defined than the others and tends to have less predict-
able results when it is applied. This theory is based upon mu-
tual contacts between the state and a private entity. For
example, state action has been found where a state leased a
public building on public property to a private entity for use as
a restaurant which refused to serve blacks," and where a mu-
nicipality allowed exclusive access to its recreational facilities
by segregated private schools and by groups affiliated with
such schools."
In the Ludtke case, the determination of the existence of
state action was made under the Burton standard of "sifting
facts and weighing circumstances." 3 As in Burton, Ludtke in-
volved the private use of city property, the use by the New
York Yankees of New York City-owned Yankee Stadium. Bur-
ton, like the Ludtke case, was based on both the state com-
mandment or encouragement of private activities theory and
on the mutual contacts theory.
However, the Ludtke court reinforced its conclusion that
39. Citizens Council on Human Relations v. Buffalo Yacht Club, 438 F. Supp. 316
(W.D.N.Y. 1977).
40. Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1974).
41. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 715.
42. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
43. Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. at 93 (quoting Clark, J., 365 U.S. at 722).
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state action was present by applying the Second Circuit's five-
pronged test for the existence of state action in section 1983
cases first articulated in Jackson v. Statler Foundation."
Under this test, the five factors to be examined are (1) the pri-
vate entity's degree of dependence on governmental aid; (2)
the extent and intrusiveness of governmental regulation in-
volved; (3) whether or not aid is given to all similar institutions
or is suggestive of the government's approval of the activity
challenged in the particular case; (4) whether or not the insti-
tution under attack performs a public function; and (5) the le-
gitimacy of the organization's claim to be regarded as private
in character, in associational or constitutional terms.4 5
Applying this five-pronged test to the facts of Ludtke, the
court stressed that "the absence of any one of the five factors is
not to be deemed preclusive of the existence of state action.""
One of the key factors that weighed in the plaintiffs' favor was
the fact that Yankee Stadium is devoted to a public use. The
property on which the stadium stands and the stadium itself
were acquired by New York City through exercise of its power
of eminent domain.47 Substantial renovation and moderniza-
tion of the facilities was done to keep the Yankees from leaving
New York City." The heavy investment of public funds was
believed to be important to the ongoing cultural activity of the
city.49 Further, approximately $50 million was spent to prepare
the stadium for the 1976 baseball season,5 0 and a special statute
was passed by the New York state legislature which author-
44. 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974).
45. Id. at 629. The Jackson test has been followed in another Second Circuit case,
Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 407 (2d Cir. 1975); and by two United States dis-
trict courts in the Second Circuit, Korzenik v. Marrow, 401 F. Supp. 77, 81 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) and Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 578, 585 (1974): "The importance of the Jackson decision lies in the
majority's attempt to give more exact guidance to litigants concerned about whether
the state has 'significantly' involved itself, not only in the specific area of tax benefits to
charitable foundations, but also in private discrimination generally."
46. 461 F. Supp. at 95.
47. Id. at 92.
48. The Brooklyn Dodgers and the New York Giants had left the city in 1959. The
football Giants, who had been long-time tenants in Yankee Stadium, were also talking
about moving to New Jersey at the time that the plan to modernize the stadium was
conceived. The Giants later did move to New Jersey. Hallett, New York Strikes Out-
The Deal It Made On Yankee Stadium Is a Loser, Barron's, Oct. 16, 1978, at 4.
49. N.Y. Session Laws ch. 986, § 1 (McKinney 1971) provides, "It is hereby found
that Yankee Stadium is important to the cultural, recreational and economic vitality of
the state and city."
50. 461 F. Supp. at 92.
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ized the city of New York to lease the stadium to the Yankees
rather than to the highest bidder. In light of these facts, it
seemed to the court that the Yankees had received a substan-
tial amount of governmental aid, both state and local.
The court found, under the second prong of the Jackson test,
that governmental regulation was involved. By the terms of its
lease, the City of New York retained the power to approve tick-
et prices and to allow other groups the use of the stadium
when it was not needed by the Yankees.5 2 In addition, the
lease provided that the Yankees were to "comply with all pres-
ent and future federal, state and local laws" in the operation of
the stadium, and the lessor retained the right "to enforce and
assure compliance not only with local but also federal and
state laws."5 3
Under the third prong of the test, whether aid was given to
all similar institutions, the court looked to the kind of treat-
ment the Yankees had received from New York City. The sta-
dium renovation was performed with only the Yankees in
mind. Unlike most modern stadiums which are built for multi-
purpose use, Yankee Stadium cannot accommodate a football
field without a severe shortage of space around the playing
field. If artifical turf rather than grass had been used to cover
the playing field, the stadium would have been more attractive
for such potential uses as rock concerts and boxing matches."
Because of these circumstances surrounding the renovation of
the stadium, the City of New York could hardly claim that sim-
ilar aid had been given to other institutions which provided en-
tertainment for the citizens of New York. The statute which
allowed the city to lease the stadium to the ball team, and not
to the highest bidder, also supported the notion that the
Yankees had received preferential treatment from the munici-
pality.55
The fourth prong of the test, whether or not the institution
under attack performs a public function, did not fit exactly the
facts of the Ludtke case. Rather, the renovation of the stadium
and its lease to the Yankees were characterized by the court as
51. N.Y. Session Laws ch. 986, § 1 (McKinney 1971).
52. 461 F. Supp. at 92.
53. Id.
54. Hallett, supra note 48, at 14.
55. N.Y. Session Laws ch. 986, § 1 (McKinney 1971).
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a "unique undertaking."" While there was no question that
the stadium itself is devoted to a public use, the Yankees could
hardly be said to be performing a public function under a strict
interpretation of the phrase. Yet, when the state of New York
had authorized the lease to the ball club rather than to the
highest bidder, it noted that, "Yankee Stadium is important to
the cultural, recreational, and economic vitality of the state
and city."" This clear statement from the legislature must
have prompted the court to find the concept of public function
applicable in this case, though not decisive of the state action
outcome."
Another factor which bolstered the public function concept
was that the plaintiffs had also based their claim for relief on
the right to freedom of the press guaranteed by the First
Amendment and on their rights under New York's equal ac-
commodations statute." The court found it unnecessary to
reach either of these issues. However, it did find instructive
the idea of public communications use in a recent Second Cir-
cuit case dealing with the First Amendment.
In American Broadcasting Companies v. Cuomo, 6 0 a group of
political candidates had tried to exclude an ABC management
television crew from their post-election activities on private
premises. Other television crews from major networks had not
been excluded. In that case, the court stated, "We think that
once the press is invited, including the media operating by
means of instantaneous picture broadcast, there is a dedica-
56. 461 F. Supp. at 95.
57. N.Y. Session Laws ch. 986, § 1 (McKinney 1971). The special debt ceiling ex-
emption for New York City also authorized by the state legislature (N.Y. Session Laws
ch. 986, § 4) could only have been obtained if the stadium renovation and lease to the
Yankees could be certified as profitable. The bill passed, with the support of then
Govenor Nelson A. Rockefeller, and was sponsored by the state senator from the
Bronx, (where Yankee Stadium is located) Harrison A. Golden. Hallett, supra note 48,
at 4. Despite the predicted profits from the New York City-Yankee lease of the sta-
dium, the lease has proven to be a loss to the city based upon the total expenses in-
curred for the project. Because of a provision in the lease which allows the Yankees to
deduct the costs of maintaining the stadium before the city gets a percentage of the
box office and concession receipts, the city did not receive the $800,000 it could have
gotten in 1976. Instead, it ended up paying the Yankees about $10,000. In 1977, when
the city could have expected about $1,000,000 in rent, estimates are that the city got at
most $150,000. Schumach, Yanks' Stadium Lease Proves a Golden Fleece, SPORTING
NEws, Apr. 8, 1978, at 19.
58. 461 F. Supp. at 95.
59. 461 F. Supp. at 89.
60. 570 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1977).
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tion of those premises to public communications use."" Ar-
guably then, the Yankees, by inviting TV cameras into the
clubhouse, were performing a public function.
In applying the fifth prong of the Jackson test, the court re-
lied on a 1975 case, Weise v. Syracuse University,62 involving a
university's claim that it be regarded as private in character,
despite its receipt of governmental aid, for state action pur-
poses. In that case, as here, the court felt that an institution's
claim to be regarded as private in character may be out-
weighed by the harm to the public from particularly offensive
conduct. The Weise case also involved a claim of sex discrimi-
nation against an essentially private entity.
Although the Ludtke court recognized that the Yankees
team had a strong interest in retaining its status as a private
organization, it did not consider this interest as compelling as
the harm to the public interest which flowed from the blatant
discrimination against the plaintiff.
In evaluating the five-pronged Jackson test to find state ac-
tion, courts in the Second Circuit may also consider the type of
discrimination present in a case. 63 In situations where the de-
fendant's discriminatory conduct is especially offensive but
claims other than race discrimination are involved, a more rig-
orous test for state action has been proposed. In some cases
where sex-based discrimination is alleged but the defendant's
discriminatory conduct is less offensive, use of a less onerous
standard has been suggested.6 5 This two-tiered approach has
been characterized as a balancing test.6 6 The court in Weise
justified its use of a balancing test: "As the conduct com-
plained of becomes more offensive, and as the nature of the
dispute becomes more amenable to resolution by a court, the
more appropriate it is to subject the issue to judicial scru-
tiny."67
61. Id. at 1083.
62. 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
63. 461 F. Supp. at 96.
64. 461 F. Supp. at 96; see also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 635 (2d
Cir. 1974); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1142 (2d Cir. 1973); Powe v.
Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1968).
65. See Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975). Compare
Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974
(1976).




In Ludtke, Judge Motley relied on the Second Circuit's bal-
ancing approach in resolving the state action issue. Judge Mot-
ley also found a second rationale that justified her careful
scrutiny of the Yankees' exclusionary policy. While sex-based
discrimination does not provoke judicial scrutiny to the degree
that racial discrimination does, the Ludtke court embraced an
idea presented in Powe v. Miles: "we recognize that discrimi-
nation may stand somewhat differently, because of the pecu-
liar offensiveness of the state's taxing all citizens for objectives
from the benefits of which a particular category is arbitrarily
excluded or disadvantaged."6 8
Judge Motley's finding that state action did exist, in the guise
of Commissioner Kuhn's policy determination-enforced by
the Yankees-is a sound one. The conduct of the defendants
in barring females from the Yankee locker room was offensive
to the court because it was a sex-based policy, the media mem-
bers enjoyed a high degree of visibility, and the public's inter-
est in the sporting events at the stadium was substantial. The
balancing approach was an appropriate way for Judge Motley
to closely examine the Yankees' conduct and find state action.
There is another way the Ludtke court could have found
state action, one not involving either the three state action the-
ories or the five-pronged Jackson test. Both of those state ac-
tion analyses require a court to study precedent in an attempt
to find the requisite nexus between the alleged wrongdoer's
conduct and the involvement of the state in that conduct." A
far simpler approach would have been to use the decision or
rule approach to the state action issue.o Under this analysis,
Judge Motley could have traced back the policy determination
made by Kuhn and implemented by the Yankees to a point
where the state had made a decision, in effect, to allow this
type of discrimination." Then the state decision or rule would
be tested to see if it were justified constitutionally. The issue,
under this analysis of the Ludtke case, would have been: since
the state made a decision to allow the Yankees to exclude wo-
men sportwriters from the team's locker room, could that deci-
sion be justified constitutionally? The answer would have
68. 407 F.2d at 73,82 (2d Cir. 1968) (partially quoted in Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp.
86, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
69. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 1158 (1978).
70. Id. at 1159.
71. Id. at 1160.
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been that no constitutional justification could be found to per-
mit such discrimination by the Yankees. Because Yankee Sta-
dium is a public place, dedicated to a public purpose, a right of
access could not be constitutionally denied to the plaintiff
solely because of her sex.
The result reached under the decision or rule analysis would
be identical to the result reached under Judge Motley's state
actor approach, using the traditional case-by-case approach to
the state action issue. However, it would have been reached
without resort to an examination of the underlying merits of
the case before deciding the state action issue,7 2 and would
have served as a more clearly defined precedent to any similar
conduct by sports teams now or in the future.13
However, Judge Motley was bound to follow existing Second
Circuit precedent and to use the Jackson test. The same re-
sult, that the Kuhn policy determination which excluded wo-
men sports writers from the Yankee clubhouse's locker room
constituted state action, was reached. Once having found the
requisite state action, the court had to determine if that action
infringed upon any right of the plaintiff guaranteed by the Con-
stitution and/or the laws of the United States.
III
Sex Discrimination
The plaintiffs based their claim, that the state action consti-
tuted impermissible discrimination against women, upon the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The
plaintiffs also invoked the due process clause of that amend-
ment to support their claim that the state action interfered
with the plaintiffs' First Amendment right to freedom of the
72. See note 34 and accompanying text, supra.
73. Even after the Ludtke decision was announced, Commissioner Kuhn's memo-
randum to the twenty-six major-league clubs suggested that the matter of admitting
female reporters to the teams' clubhouses would be largely left to the discretion of the
individual teams. The result, in 1979, was that about half of the twenty-six ballparks
had some form of post-game access to the clubhouses. Angell, supra note 10, at 46.
The forms of access granted to media personnel generally in 1979 were 1) all reporters
were granted access to the clubhouses, 2) open and closed periods were instituted in
the clubhouses for all, or 3) all interviews were required to be held in a separate media
room. Kuhn Changes Policy for Women in Media, SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 31, 1979, at 55.
74. 461 F. Supp. at 89. The Fourteenth Amendment claim was the basis underlying
the plaintiffs' prayer for relief under § 1983. See note 21 and accompanying text, supra.
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The court found it "difficult to determine" whether to apply
an equal protection analysis or a due process analysis. Judge
Motley's uncertainty on this point was understandable in view
of three recent Supreme Court cases dealing with discrimina-
tion.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,77 a school dis-
trict had mandatory maternity leave rules. The Court struck
down the rules as being violative of plaintiffs rights under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However,
the case apparently rested on an equal protection rationale. It
was the arbitrary classification by pregnancy to which the
Court objected, and not the denial of any due process to the
plaintiff.78
In Califano v. Goldfarb," the husband of a worker who had
paid into the Social Security system challenged the denial of
Social Security benefits to widowers who could not prove de-
pendency. The receipt of such benefits by widows did not re-
quire a similar showing of dependency. The Court noted that
an equal protection analysis could not center on the distinction
drawn between widowers and widows, but must be focused on
the gender-based discrimination against female wage earners.
75. 461 F. Supp. at 89. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits governmental actions
which would deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." The term due process has several different meanings. As used in this context,
however, there are two types of due process which must be distinguished. Substantive
due process can be used to protect certain fundamental rights. See note 82, infra.
Substantive due process can also be used to void arbitrary legislative limitations of
individual freedom of action. This type of substantive due process, which is involved
here, applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause by
the incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights. See HANDBOOK ON CON-
sTrrurIONAL LAw, supra note 29, at 476. See also note 107 and accompanying text, in-
fra.
Procedural due process, however, guarantees that each person shall be accorded cer-
tain types of procedural safeguards when the government uses its power to deprive an
individual of life, liberty, or property. It means that an individual has a right to a fair
procedure to determine the basis of such action and whether or not it is legal. See
HANDBOOK ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw, supra note 29, at 477.
76. 461 F. Supp. at 96 n.7.
77. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
78. Justice Stewart, in speaking for the majority, said, "We thus conclude that the
arbitrary cutoff dates embodied in the mandatory leave rules before us have no ra-
tional relationship to the valid state interest of preserving continuity of instruction."
414 U.S. at 643. See also HANDBOOK ON CONsTrrUTIONAL LAw, supra note 29, at 497,
where the relationship between due process, irrebuttable presumptions, and equal
protection is discussed.
79. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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The proof-of-dependency provision was found to violate the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In Zablocki v. Redhail,ao involving a state's requirement that
court approval be obtained before a resident who was obli-
gated to support minor children could marry, the majority of
the Court held that the state action violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The concurrence
written by Justice Stewart, however, stated that the due proc-
ess clause of that amendment should have been used to strike
down the statute. The rationale for Justice Stewart's opinion
was that the right to marry is not an enumerated freedom in
the Constitution, but one implicated under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Supreme Court has not drawn a clear line for the judici-
ary to follow in deciding whether an equal protection or a due
process analysis should be used. The Ludtke court's inability
to determine which analysis to apply reflects the tension in
this area.
When a fundamental right8 2 is alleged to have been infringed
upon, and where a gender-based classification is involved, the
analysis should be under the equal protection clause.8 3 Under
the due process clause, there does not need to be a classifica-
tion in order for the court to subject the law or practice to judi-
cial examination. Rather, the court analyzes the law or
practice to determine if it rationally relates to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective.8 4
Judge Motley found it diflicult to determine whether an
equal protection analysis or a due process analysis should be
used, and because the plaintiffs had invoked both clauses in
their claim for relief, the court analyzed the Kuhn policy deter-
mination under both clauses. Judge Motley felt it was plain
that the case involved discrimination against women solely be-
cause of their sex, as well as a "substantial interference with
80. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
81. Id. at 392.
82. A fundamental right is one defined by the Supreme Court to be a speciflc type
of civil liberty. Such rights include 1) First Amendment rights, 2) the right to engage
in interstate travel, 3) the right to vote, 4) the right to fair proceedings before a depri-
vation of personal liberty, 5) the right to privacy which includes some rights to free-
dom of choice in sexual matters, and 6) the right to freedom of choice in marriage. See
HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 29, at 382 n.3.




the fundamental right of plaintiff Ludtke to pursue her profes-
sion as a sports reporter free from unreasonable state regula-
tion.""
A. Equal Protection
Under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, courts test whether the gender-based classification im-
posed has a substantial relationship to an important
governmental objective.8 6 A more stringent test, the strict
scrutiny standard, is used in "suspect" classifications, i.e.,
those based on one's status as a racial minority, on one's na-
tional origin, or on one's lack of United States citizenship.8
However, the standard used by Judge Motley is often referred
to as a form of strict scrutiny, and it is used whenever a court
reviews legislation based on gender or legitimacy." It is con-
sidered a more intense review than the traditional rational re-
lationship test originally used in sex discrimination cases."
In this case, the justifications advanced by the defendants for
the Kuhn policy determination were (1) to protect the privacy
of the ballplayers while they were undressing in the locker
rooms, (2) to protect the image of baseball as a family sport,
and (3) to preserve traditional notions of decency and propri-
ety.90
Judge Motley examined whether these were, in fact, impor-
tant governmental objectives that could justify the discrimina-
tion against the plaintiff. She rejected the second and third
justifications advanced by the defendants as "clearly too insub-
stantial to merit serious consideration."9 1 The court felt that
only the right to privacy asserted by the defendants was "of
constitutional dimension," and that it was an important objec-
tive.9 2 However, Judge Motley did not find the requisite sub-
stantial relationship between this objective and the total
exclusion of women from the Yankee locker room.
Three factors persuaded the court that the real purpose be-
hind the exclusion of women from the locker room was to
85. 461 F. Supp. at 96 n.7.
86. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
87. See HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 29, at 525.
88. Id. at 601-19.
89. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
90. 461 F. Supp. at 92.
91. Id. at 98.
92. Id. at 97.
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maintain the facility as an all-male preserve. This purpose was
found to be violative of plaintiff's right to equal protection of
the laws.
First, during the World Series games, television cameras
were brought into the Yankee locker room by male members of
the news media. These newscasters were allowed to broadcast
live from the locker room, using only a backdrop behind the
player standing in front of the camera, which was used to block
the camera's view of the rest of the locker room activity. The
television audience watching the live post-game coverage
could have been expected to include both women and children.
As the court noted in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.
v. Cuomo, "It is idle to speak of privacy when the affair is pub-
licly transmitted by broadcast to millions of viewers.""
Thus, the issue became not whether the players' privacy was
being violated but whether all members of the media were
granted equal access. Since all members of the media had not
been excluded, it seemed ludicrous to deny to the plaintiff, in
person and in her professional capacity as a sportswriter, what
millions of women could see at home on their television sets.
This factor led the court to conclude that the defendants' prac-
tice of refusing to allow accredited women sports reporters into
the locker room was substantially related "only to maintaining
the locker room as an all-male preserve.""
Second, the court's conclusion about the real purpose behind
Kuhn's policy was supported by the statements of the defend-
ants' own counsel. At the hearing on the cross-motions for
summary judgment, Judge Motley questioned the attorney for
the defendants about the locker room layout. Each ballplayer
had a cubicle large enough to accommodate him while he
dressed and undressed, and it was open in the front. Counsel
for the defendants admitted, in response to the court's ques-
tions, that it was possible to put curtains or swinging doors in
front of the cubicle so that a ballplayer could hide from women
sportswriters if he wanted to. The attorney also stated that it
was possible for the player to shield himself with a towel."
Since simple alternatives were available to protect the play-
ers' privacy interests, the court felt that the defendants' as-
serted interest could not stand against the plaintiff's right to an
93. 570 F.2d at 1083.
94. 461 F. Supp. at 97.
95. Id. at 97-98.
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equal opportunity to gather news in the same way, and at the
same time, as her male counterparts.
Third, when admitting that a player could use a towel to
cover himself from the eyes of female sports reporters, defense
counsel stated that, "It's not the way people who play baseball
are accustomed to [sic] have the freedom of access after their
own game."9 6 The court interpreted this to mean that the de-
fendants were attempting to justify their total exclusion of wo-
men by claiming that this was a custom in a baseball locker
room. However, custom was not enough to justify the defend-
ants' policy, especially where the plaintiff was placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage in relation to male sportswriters."
Since there were alternatives available to allow plaintiff
Ludtke to pursue her profession as a sportswriter, the Kuhn
policy determination was found not to be substantially related
to the privacy protection objective asserted by the defendants.
The court held that the sex-based discrimination against
Ludtke was a deprivation of equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed her by the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Due Process
The court's difficulty in deciding which clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to use in this case was based upon an erro-
neous interpretation of the fundamental rights covered by the
96. 461 F. Supp. at 98.
97. Id. at 98. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) where saving the
government time, money, and effort was held not to justify gender-based discrimina-
tion; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) where eliminating the need for administrative
hearings on the merits of who was better qualified to be an administrator of a dece-
dent's estate was held not to justify gender-based discrmination. The Ludtke court's
finding that the defendants' custom argument could not survive constitutional attack
was perhaps also influenced by the fact that female sportswriters had, since 1975, been
admitted to the locker rooms of professional hockey, basketball, soccer, and football
teams. 461 F. Supp. at 91.
When a female sportswriter is denied access to the same news sources that her male
counterparts can reach freely, her career is seriously hampered. A reporter desiring
promotion to a better job in sportswriting, such as covering a beat (that is, an assign-
ment to cover the entire season of a particular team on a daily basis), cannot expect to
get such a job if he or she is denied the chance to speak with the sources for news
stories, the players themselves. As sportswriter Betty Cuniberti said, "I believe that it
is precisely because women are prohibited from entering male locker rooms in certain
sports that sports editors do not hire more women to cover 'beats'. This is the biggest
injustice of all because of the high value of a beat assignment to any sports reporter's
career." Affidavits of Professional Journalists for Plaintiffs, supra note 2, at tab 4,
Betty Cuniberti of the Washington Post.
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due process clause." This was understandable, though, in
light of the Supreme Court's ambiguity in this area.99 The
court used a due process analysis of the same facts it had ex-
amined under the equal protection discussion in the case and
concluded that under both analyses, an "identical" result
would be reached. 00
The three Supreme Court cases cited by the court in Ludtke
dealt with the issue of whether the right to pursue an occupa-
tion was a right protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is true that the sweeping language
of these cases suggests that the freedom to pursue an occupa-
tion might be a fundamental right under the Constitution.
However, the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that
there is such a fundamental right.
In the oldest case, Allgeyer v. Louisiana,'0' the Court in 1897
said, "The liberty mentioned in that amendment [the Four-
teenth Amendment] means . .. the right of the citizen . . . to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any liveli-
hood or avocation. ... "102 The Court in Meyer v. Nebraska,oa
decided in 1923, stated that, "Without doubt, it [the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause] denotes . .. the right of the individual . .. to engage in
any of the common occupations of life. . . ."104 In Greene v.
McElroy,10 the most recent case which the Ludtke court cited,
the Supreme Court in 1959 said, "[T]he right to hold specific
private employment and to follow a chosen profession free
from unreasonable governmental interference comes within
the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment
"5106
These older cases pointed to the right to pursue one's occu-
pation as being a liberty interest, but not a substantive right.
The Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall "deprive
any person of . .. liberty without due process of law." How-
ever, the level of scrutiny to which a court subjects a liberty
98. See note 82, supra.
99. See notes 77-84 and accompanying text, supra.
100. 461 F. Supp. at 98.
101. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
102. Id. at 589.
103. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
104. Id. at 399.
105. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
106. Id. at 492.
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interest is not as strict as that to which a fundamental, or sub-
stantive, right is subjected. Using strict scrutiny, a court re-
quires that the law or practice in question be necessary to
promote a compelling state interest if it is to limit the funda-
mental rights of individuals.10 If that standard is not met, then
the limit will be found violative of the due process clause.
Thus, it is likely that legislative interference with a fundamen-
tal right will not survive judicial scrutiny and will be struck
down as violative of an individual's substantive rights under
the due process clause. 0
An infringement of a liberty interest is not subject to the
same intense level of judicial review. Under the due process
clause the challenged restraint must only be rationally related
to a legitimate end of government. 09 Courts are much more
inclined to find this kind of rational relationship than they are
to find the restraint necessary to promote a compelling state
interest. Thus, it is more likely that legislative interference
with a liberty interest will survive this lesser standard of judi-
cial scrutiny and be upheld as not violative of an individual's
right under the due process clause."x0
Two recent cases, decided after Ludtke, indicate that the
Supreme Court does not intend that the freedom to pursue
one's occupation be deemed a fundamental right. In Leis v.
Flynt,"' decided on January 15, 1979, the Court held that the
privilege accorded by most states which allowed an out-of-
state lawyer to appear upon motion "is not a right granted ei-
ther by statute or the Constitution."" 2 The Court found that
the lawyers who had brought the suit "did not possess a cogni-
zable property interest within the terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment....
One month later, in Harrah Independent School District v.
Martin,"' the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals on the issue of whether a teacher had a con-
stitutional right to retain her employment as a teacher. The
Court stated, "there is no claim that the interest entitled to
107. See HANDBOOK ON CONSTrrIIONAL LAw, supra note 29, at 382-83.
108. Id. at 409-10.
109. Id. at 383.
110. Id. at 409-10.
111. 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
112. Id. at 442.
113. Id. at 443.
114. 440 U.S. 194 (1979).
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protection as a matter of substantive due process was anything
resembling 'the individual's freedom of choice with respect to
certain basic matters of procreation, marriage, and family
life.' "115
The Supreme Court thus sharply limited the scope of what a
liberal reading of Skinner v. Oklahoma16 and its progeny
would imply is a part of the right of privacy under the substan-
tive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,17 the Court mentioned that it had
"had many controversies over these penumbral rights of 'pri-
vacy and repose'.""' It is not surprising that this controversy
continues some 15 years after Griswold.
Since the Supreme Court apparently interprets the right of
privacy to include only substantive rights which are basic to an
individual's freedom in marriage, procreation, and family mat-
ters, the right to make a living must remain a part of the due
process liberty interests.119 In Ludtke, Judge Motley should
have dealt only with the equal protection issue and not at-
tempted to get into the murky area of due process as a basis for
the decision. By basing its decision on due process, the court
created a precedent broader than necessary and broader than
what would have been ruled had the case been decided on the
equal protection grounds alone. 2 0
The Ludtke decision suggests that the right to pursue one's
profession is a fundamental right and should be made a part of
the new right of privacy. However, if this liberty interest were
to be made a fundamental right, any law attempting to limit
one's freedom in this area could be struck down unless it met
the very exacting compelling state interest test. If this free-
dom is left as a liberty interest, any law stifling it would stand if
it were rationally related to a legitimate governmental objec-
115. Id. at 198.
116. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). This case, which never mentioned the right of privacy, did
provide the modern genesis for its constitutional recognition.
117. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This was the case that created the right of privacy. This
right had no textual basis in the Constitution, but rather was implied by Justice Doug-
las in Griswold from the "penumbras" and "emanations" of the Bill of Rights.
118. Id. at 485.
119. Harrah Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979); Kelley v. John-
son, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
120. Foote, The Proper Role of the United States Supreme Court in Civil Liberties
Cases, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 457, 471-72 (1964).
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tive.121
In our complex, highly-ordered society, often the only way
for an individual to pursue a chosen occupation is by special-
ized training or advanced education. Since there are practical
limits on the number of students that a training program or an
institution of higher learning can accept, a constitutional man-
date in this area would only serve to complicate an admittedly
delicate balance. Assuming that a state could impose certain
minimum standards for entry into its educational programs,
one could argue that the denial of admission to such programs,
because of lack of sufficient space to accommodate all qualified
students, would, in effect, deny access to an occupation.12 2 The
question then becomes, where would a court draw the line?
Would insufficient space or funds be state interests compelling
enough to justify a refusal of admission to a program?
These are not areas within the sphere of judicial competence
and ones best left to schools, colleges, and universities. The
Supreme Court, given its recent holdings, would appear to be
reluctant to open the lid of this Pandora's box. Such an ap-
proach seems justified at this time, when the citizenry itself is
sharply divided by these issues. 2 3
IV,
Conclusion
The Ludtke case presented a straightforward equal protec-
tion issue, only somewhat complicated by the state action
question. However, it is only nine years since the first case
found discrimination against women to be violative of the
equal protection clause.12 4 Since that time, numerous deci-
sions have affirmed a woman's right to enter the marketplace
and participate fully in society. However, this is not a settled
area of the law. Because the initial inquiry in civil rights cases
dealing with sex discrimination focuses on state action, and be-
cause the results of the "sifting facts and weighing circum-
121. See notes 107-09 and accompanying text, supra.
122. See Henkin, What of the Right to Practice a Profession?, 67 CAuF. L. REV. 131
(1979).
123. Indicative of the recent dilemma over affirmative action programs in employ-
ment is United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Illustrative of the problems
faced by educational institutions trying to implement special admissions programs is
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
124. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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stances"125 standard continue to be unpredictable, it is difficult
to determine the parameters of these decisions.
In two recent cases dealing with claims by minor females
that they had been denied the right to play baseball on boys'
teams, the conflicting results were not predictable from the vir-
tually indistinguishable factual situations presented. How-
ever, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Fortin v. Darlington
Little League, Inc.'26 held that the plaintiff had been deprived
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to her by the
Fourteenth Amendment, while the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conferencel2 7 denied a
minor female's claim under the same clause of the same
amendment.
These cases, decided within two months of one another, did
have one dissimilarity that might have led to the difference in
result. In Fortin, the entity sued was Little League Baseball,
Inc., a corporation created by a special Act of Congress.128
Shortly after the appeal was argued, the charter was revised by
Congress to allow girls to participate in Little League on an
equal basis with boys.12 1 In Magill, the entity sued was a non-
profit, private corporation. Although neither of the cases dealt
at length with the distinction between a federally chartered
and a private corporation, it may have been significant. The
Fortin court found that where the organization was federally
chartered, there was state action. But, the Magill court found
no state action where the organization was a private corpora-
tion.
If a case like Ludtke were to present itself today, it is difficult
to predict whether it would succeed or fail. However, a few
generalizations can be drawn. The closer the fiscal relation-
ship between the public lessor and the private lessee to the
"unique undertaking" of Ludtke, the stronger a plaintiffs case
would be. Where public funds have been spent, where the
state or municipality has received some financial benefit from
the operation of the stadium, and where the lessor has retained
power to enforce all laws against the lessee, state action would
125. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text, supra.
126. 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975).
127. 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975).
128. 36 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976).
129. 514 F.2d at 346.
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likely be found. This is especially true if media access has
been granted.
Courts should follow Judge Motley's example and enjoin
sports teams that deny equal access to women sportswriters.
If any sportswriter is to have immediate post-game access to
athletes in the locker room, then it should rightly be given
without regard to gender.
Perhaps the fairest solution to the problem would be to ask
the teams what they want. At present, the owner of the
franchise makes that determination. The players on each team
should be the ones to vote on the issue of equal access. If
enough of them felt that their rights to privacy were being com-
promised, then all sportswriters would be banned from the
locker room until the athletes had showered and dressed. Al-
ternately, the post-game interviews could be conducted in a
special room for the media after the players had changed from
their uniforms into street clothes.
The laws have opened the doors of the Yankee locker room
to Melissa Ludtke, but it remains to be seen whether this kind
of legal action will have to be repeated in other forums across
the country. Real equality for women sportswriters will have
been achieved only when the question of equal access to locker
rooms is moot.
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